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Getting away with murder: Political violence on trial in interwar France1 
Chris Millington, Swansea University 
In February 1939, L’Humanité, the mouthpiece of the French communist party, published a 
list of comrades who had died ‘in order that liberty lives’.  This ‘martyrology’ contained the 
names of 41 men killed in violence with political enemies and the police since the crisis of 
February 1934 when nationalist groups had come within a hair’s breadth of toppling the 
democratic regime.  The photographs of eleven of the victims that framed the list included 
that of the youngest victim, René Scorticatti, killed on 9 May 1934 in the Parisian suburb of 
Livry-Gargan.2 On the night of his death, Scorticatti had joined an antifascist counter-
demonstration to a meeting of the extreme right-wing league, the Croix de Feu.  Police had 
managed to prevent the demonstrators from entering the meeting venue.  The antifascists, 
frustrated with their failure, erected barricades in front of the railway station.  Skirmishes 
ensued and superintendent Pochon was seriously injured by a blow to the head.  As the 
demonstrators began to dissipate, several shots were fired and Scorticatti was struck.  A 
ballistic analysis showed that the bullet had not been fired from a police firearm.  Ultimately, 
the case was dismissed; police surmised that a stray bullet fired by Scorticatti’s comrades had 
hit the young man.3 For the antifascist press, the death was highly symbolic: the nascent 
union between onetime rivals the communist and socialist parties had been ‘sealed in blood’.  
Socialist journalist Jean-Maurice Hermann concluded: ‘Is fascism beginning to understand 
the strength that resides in the united working class?... This young communist… [who passed 
                                                 
1 Acknowledgements 
2  Anon. Ceux qui sont morts pour que vive la liberté. L’Humanité, 12 February 1939, p. 8. 
3 AN BB18 2919.  Le Procureur de la République à Pontoise à Monsieur le Procureur Général 
près la Cour d’Appel de Paris. 11 May 1934; Le Procureur de la République à Pontoise à 
Monsieur le Procureur Général près la Cour d’Appel de Paris. 14 June 1934. 
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away] in the arms of two socialists will not soon be forgotten by workers in the region.  In the 
face of bullets and truncheons, the deep feeling of class unity was solidified before the 
common enemy’.4 The killer remained at large. 
In several ways, Scorticatti’s death was emblematic of the violent street politics of 
interwar France: confrontations between political rivals were small in scale; groups fought 
cat-and-mouse skirmishes with the police as often as they fought with their rivals; few people 
were punished for the killing of a political activist.  This final point provides the focus for this 
article.  The trial and punishment of men and women involved in violence in a political 
context presented many practical problems for police investigators and jurists.  For political 
groups the prosecution and punishment of these crimes – or the lack thereof - was highly 
significant.  Criminal cases saw the conflict of the street extended into the court house, giving 
all parties a chance to put their enemies on trial.  They represented, too, an opportunity to test 
the alleged impartiality of the Republic.  An unsatisfactory outcome to a case or the failure to 
bring a perpetrator to answer for a crime drew condemnation not simply of the judge or jury 
but also of the entire political system.  In the partisan conflict of the era, the court room was 
an important arena.      
The challenge to Third Republican law and order between the wars was determined.  
This challenge was not unprecedented in its ferocity – the Republic had dealt with violence 
before, from the anti-Semitic disturbances during the Dreyfus Affair to the protests of striking 
workers during 1906-7 – but political antagonisms between 1918 and 1940, and the resultant 
violence, were unparalleled in their persistence.  The 1920s saw the founding of several 
extreme right-wing ‘leagues’.  The Faisceau, led by Georges Valois, lionised Mussolini and 
pursued its own fascist political programme.  Its uniformed hard-men fought both with their 
                                                 
4 Hermann JM.  L’inqualifiable agression de la police parsienne contre les manifestants 
ouvriers de Livry-Gargan.  Le Populaire,11 May 1934, pp. 1-2. 
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left-wing enemies and the street brawlers of the monarchist Action Française, a bitter right-
wing rival.  Meanwhile, champagne magnate and nationalist deputy Pierre Taittinger founded 
the Jeunesses Patriotes, an offshoot of the older Ligue des Patriotes.  Its bereted and trench 
coat-wearing brigades provided security at right-wing meetings.  The communist left 
responded to the leagues’ paramilitarism with their own squads of street fighters, the Groupes 
de Défense Antifascistes.  Members of the groups were drawn from the communist veterans’ 
association and the Jeunesses Communistes, providing what the party perceived to be the 
necessary tactical nous and muscle to defeat fascism in the street.5  Nationalist and antifascist 
activists, from newspaper sellers to speechmakers, scuffled regularly in the streets and 
meeting halls of France as they contested the ownership of public space; a handful of men 
died. 
 The highpoint of French political violence came during the 1930s when at least 70 
people were killed.  Spasms of bloody violence punctuated the decade.  On 6 February 1934 
more than a dozen people died at the hands of the police during a night of nationalist rioting 
in Paris.  Three years later, in March 1937, six people were killed outside a right-wing 
meeting in Clichy during a clash between antifascists and the forces of order. 6  Beyond these 
periodic outbreaks of disorder, the emergence of new political formations and strategies saw 
                                                 
5 Soucy R. French fascism: The first wave. New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 
1986; Millington C. Communist veterans and paramilitarism in 1920s France: The 
Association républicaine des anciens combattants. Journal of War and Culture Studies 2015; 
8, 300-314. 
6 Jenkins B and Millingon C. France and fascism: February 1934 and the dynamics of 
political crisis. London: Routledge, 2016; Kitson S. The police and the Clichy massacre, 
March 1937. In: Bessel R and Emsley C (eds) Patterns of provocation: Police and public 
disorder New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2000, pp. 29-40. 
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a mushrooming of daily political violence.  New leagues emerged.  Marcel Bucard’s fascist 
Francistes glorified violence in its press; the league would survive into the dark years of the 
Occupation though it counted barely a few thousand members.  The blue-shirted leaguers of 
the Solidarité Française executed punitive expeditions against their political and racial 
enemies, notably the population of Paris’s Jewish quarter.  The largest league of the period 
was the Croix de Feu.  Under the leadership of Colonel François de La Rocque, the Croix de 
Feu used mass motorised rallies and demonstrations to impress sympathisers and intimidate 
enemies.  By 1936, it had approximately 500, 000 members.  While the extreme right pursued 
paramilitarism, the antifascist left shunned the tactic in favour of the organisation of large 
counter-demonstrations to league meetings and gatherings.  So-called ‘mass self-defence’ 
represented the response to fascism of the now-allied socialist and communist parties.  This 
‘Popular Front’ alliance triumphed in the elections of May-June 1936 and promptly outlawed 
the leagues.  The smaller right-wing formations fell into obscurity.  La Rocque’s league 
remodelled itself as the Parti Social Français and, while its members continued to engage in 
episodic violence, the party moved away from paramilitarism.  A new formation, Jacques 
Doriot’s Parti Populaire Français, was founded in summer 1936.  Doriot encouraged the 
party’s members to take the fight to the communist enemy in the street and the party would 
become one of the principal collaborationist organisations of the war years.7            
                                                 
7 Kalman S. The extreme right in interwar France: The Faisceau and the Croix de Feu. 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009; Kennedy S. Reconciling France against democracy: The Croix de 
Feu and the Parti Social Francais, 1927-1945. (Montreal; Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2007); Millington C. Street-fighting men: Political violence in interwar France. English 
Historical Review 2014; 129: 606-638; Soucy R. French fascism: The second wave. New 
Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1995. 
5 
 
 Historians had until recently tended to dismiss the political confrontations of the 
interwar period as benign, confined either to words alone or to relatively non-violent clashes 
that did not bear comparison, for example, with the bloody violence of the late Weimar 
Republic.  Typical of this historiographical approach was Serge Berstein’s assertion that the 
‘latent’ civil war in France was ‘simulated’.  Behind this assertion lay the contention that the 
lack of violence in politics pointed to a deep commitment to a Republican political culture 
that prioritised democratic competition over street fighting, a fact that rendered the French 
‘allergic’ to political extremism.8  Berstein’s conclusions, though drawn in 1985 when there 
was little empirical research into the phenomenon, have dominated the historiography.9 
Nevertheless, during the 1990s, historians began to challenge this orthodoxy.  Allen Douglas 
and Kevin Passmore’s studies of the Faisceau and the Croix de Feu respectively exposed the 
centrality of paramilitary violence to the political strategy of these groups and hinted at a 
broader toleration of violence in French politics, too.10 Ultimately, there was no simple 
                                                 
8 Berstein S. La France des années trente allergique au fascisme. Vingtième Siècle. Revue 
d’histoire 1984; 2 : 83-94 ; Berstein S. L'affrontement simulé des années 1930. Vingtième 
Siècle. Revue d’histoire 1985; 5 : 39-54.  
9 See for example Burrin P. Poings levés et bras tendus.  La contagion des symboles au temps 
du Front populaire. Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire 1986; 11: 5-20; Vidal G. Violence et 
politique dans la France des années 1930: Le cas de l'autodéfense communiste.  Revue 
historique 2006 ; xxxviii : 901-922. 
10 Douglas A. Violence and fascism: The case of the Faisceau. Journal of Contemporary 
History 1984; 19: 689–712; Passmore K. Boy scouting for grown-ups?  Paramilitarism in the 
Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Français. French Historical Studies 1995; 19: 527–557.  In 
addition to the work of Douglas and Passmore, see Kennedy S. Pitfalls of paramilitarism: The 
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relationship between rhetorical violence and its physical expression.  Violent speech did not 
necessarily bring catharsis to bitter political enemies.  The violence that frequently erupted 
exposed the limits to which a democratic political culture pervaded society.  The analysis of 
the narratives constructed around violent incidents, and the attitudes to violence contained 
within, reveal that the authorities tolerated small-scale physical aggression while political 
groups considered violence an acceptable means of political engagement when framed as 
defensive or committed in revenge.11 
This article seeks to historicise further attitudes to political violence through a novel 
means of investigation: the judicial means by which the State attempted to control and punish 
violence.  An examination of the State’s repression of violence at the lower levels of the 
judicial system in the magistrates court (the tribune or cour correctionnel, in which three 
judges tried the case and imposed the sentence) reveals a toleration of police violence and, in 
turn, the severe repression of physical aggression against officers.  The article investigates, 
too, the allegations of bias made against the judicial system by activists of various political 
groups.  Such partiality was at times cited as a justification for taking the law into one’s own 
hands, to punish an enemy who would escape punishment in the courts.  Political prejudice in 
the courts was plain in other countries.  In Weimar Germany, for example, the right-wing, 
anti-Republican bias of the judiciary saw left-wingers treated more severely than 
                                                                                                                                                        
Croix de Feu, the Parti Social Français and the French State, 1934-1939. Journal of Conflict 
Studies 2007; 27: 64–79.   
11 Millington C. Street-fighting men: Political violence in interwar France. English Historical 
Review 2014; 129: 606-638; Millington C. Duelling with words and fists: Meeting hall 
violence in interwar France.  In: Millington C and Passmore K (eds) Political violence and 
democracy in western Europe, 1918-1940. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015, pp. 112-126. 
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nationalists.12 In Italy, police and judicial officials sympathetic to fascism ensured that right-
wingers often escaped charges.13 There was no such right-wing bias in the French judiciary.  
In fact, a system of political patronage, favouritism and nepotism often saw men promoted 
based on their political sureness as Republicans.14 If any partiality can be perceived in the 
French judicial system, it was in the courts’ protection of police officers from prosecution 
rather than in an attitude favourable to either left or right. 
The investigation of the trials of a handful of activists at the superior assizes court 
(cour d’assises) has the potential to reveal partisan attitudes to Republican justice as well as 
broader understandings of political violence and its perceived legitimacy.  The theatrical 
nature of proceedings at the assizes court saw these trials serve as political staging grounds in 
which lawyers put the doctrine of the enemy on trial.  Grandstanding and histrionics from the 
witnesses were further intended to arouse the emotions of the jury, a panel of twelve men 
who decided the verdict by majority vote.  Jury trials were notorious for the erratic nature of 
their outcomes.  Jurors often opted for leniency, especially in cases of violent crime.15  In 
                                                 
12 Evans RJ. The coming of the Third Reich. London: Penguin, 2004, pp. 134-138. 
13 Petersen J. Violence in Italian Fascism. In: Mommsen WJ and Hirschfeld G (eds) Social 
protest, violence and terror in nineteenth and twentieth-century Europe. London: Macmillan, 
1982, pp. 275-300; Berry F. Le Fascisme en France. Paris: Librarire de l’Humanité, 1926, p. 
9. 
14 Bancaud A. Une exception ordinaire.  La magistrature en France, 1930-1950. Paris: 
Gallimard, 2002, pp. 148-152; Chauvaud F and Yvorel J-J. Le juge, le tribun et le comptable.  
Histoire de l’organisation judiciaire entre les puvoirs, les savoirs et les discours (1789-
1930). Paris: Anthropos, 1995, pp. 282-287. 
15 Donovan JM. Justice unblind: The juries and the criminal cases in France, 1825-1914. 
Journal of Social History 1981; 15: 89-107. 
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1894, Emile Yvernes, honorary division head at the Ministry of Justice, noted the 
‘indulgence’ of the jury for so-called ‘crimes of passion’ and speculated that the same were 
true of murder (assassinat) and homicide without premeditation (meutre).  Indeed, with the 
instances of such crimes before the assizes court increasing by 44 percent and 62 percent 
respectively between 1869 and 1890, Yvernes was perplexed that acquittals in cases of 
violence against the person had almost doubled in the same period.16 Furthermore, in 81 
percent of convictions in 1890 jurors saw fit to grant ‘mitigating circumstances’ 
(circonstance atténuantes), a provision that required the judge to reduce the severity of the 
sentence by one degree, but permitted him to do so by two.17  
Evidence from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suggests that in arriving at 
their decision, in addition to the failure of the police and the investigating magistrate to 
establish a sufficient case, jurors relied on their own presumptions and prejudices about the 
perceived legitimacy of the criminal act when measured against popular attitudes rather than 
against the letter of the law.18 Trials of political activists at the assizes court were too few to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
16 The proportion of acquittals during this period rose from 16 percent in 1869 to 29 percent 
in 1890.  Yvernes E. Le crime et le criminal devant le jury.  Exposé fait à l’association 
française pour l’avancement des sciences. Congrès de Caen. Paris, 1894, pp. 4-14. 
17 Yvernes, Le crime, p. 14.  On the provision of mitigating circumstances see Chauvaud F. 
La chair des prétoires.  Histoire sensible de la cour d’assises. Rennes: Presses Universitaires 
de Rennes, 2010, p. 125; Maxwell J. Manuel du juré. Eléments de science criminelle et 
pénale à l’usage de la Cour d’assises. Paris: Flammarion éditeur, 1913, pp. 21-23. 
18 Chauvaud, La chair des prétoires, p. 127  Donovan, Justice unblind, 89-91; Farcy. J-C.  
L’histoire de la justice française de la Révolution à nos jours.  Trois décennies de 
recherches. Paris: Presses Universitaires de la France, 2001, pp. 256-258; Ferguson EE. 
9 
 
arrive at a more general conclusion about public attitudes to violence.  However, their 
outcomes demonstrate that such violence was not treated differently to other violent crimes, 
neither by the jury nor the judges in charge of sentencing.  Partial indication as to a jury’s 
attitude toward a crime may be gleaned from the sentencing of convicts after 1932 when 
jurors were invited to deliberate with the judge on sentencing.  For activists, the often-
disappointing verdicts of the assizes court, which were delivered following much press 
attention and speculation, were testament to the prejudice of the State. 
The cases selected for study here were not prosecuted for ‘politically-motivated 
violence’ or the like; no such crime was on the French statute book.  ‘Political’ crimes did 
exist; they were defined as those offences committed under the sole impetus of a person’s 
political passion.  This designation was made at the discretion of the government and it was 
usually reserved for plotting against the State rather than brawling in the street.  Political 
activists were instead charged with violations of criminal law (droit commun).  These 
included: incitement to riot (provocation à l’attroupement); possession of an illegal weapon 
on one’s person (port d’arme prohibée); assault and battery (coups et blessures); insulting 
behaviour to an officer of the law (outrage à agent); and murder, both premeditated 
(assassinat) and without premeditation (meutre).  Circumstances could aggravate the charge: 
for example, if weapons were found in the trunk of an activist’s car, rather than on his person, 
he could be charged with the constitution of an arms dump.19 While it is impossible to know 
whether every offence was committed in the pursuit of ideological goals, in interwar France 
                                                                                                                                                        
Judicial authority and popular justice: Crimes of passion in fin-de-siècle Paris. Journal of 
Social History 2006; 40: 293-315. 
19 Archives de la Préfecture de Police, Paris (hereafter referred to as APP), BA1907. A 
Valenciennes des francistes bénéficient de la scandaleuse indulgence du tribunal. Le 
Populaire, 30 March 1935. 
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incidents of violence between activists were always highly politicised in retrospect by the 
partisan press.  The crimes included here were of this nature. 
Prosecuting political violence 
There were two means by which the state authorities could attempt to limit ‘political’ 
violence.  The first method was preventative and lay in the regulation of the behaviour of 
activists in public space.  To this end there was a raft of law and order legislation at the 
disposal of the State.  Some laws were long-established: for example, the law of 30 June 1881 
introduced rules for the staging of a public meeting in order to defuse passions in the meeting 
hall.  The same law prohibited such meetings on the public highway lest a mob should 
form.20 Other laws responded to more immediate changes in the style of French street 
politics: the decrees of October 1935 introduced new legal requirements for the prior 
authorisation of street demonstrations at a time when the practice was beginning to involve 
ever-greater numbers of people.21   
The second method was repressive: the trial and punishment of activists involved in 
violent incidents.  There were three levels to the seriousness of an offence: the contravention 
(minor misdemeanour or infraction), the délit (serious offense or misdemeanour) and the 
crime (felony).  Offences committed by political activists were generally tried as a délit or a 
crime.  Individuals charged with committing a délit – such as being found in the possession in 
                                                 
20 Cossart, P. Le meeting politique: De la délibération à la manifestation. Rennes: Presses 
universitaires de Rennes, 2010, pp. 10-15; 69.   
21 Archives Nationales, Paris (hereafter AN) BB 18 3161. Le Procureur Général près la Cour 
d’Appel d’Aix à Monsieur le Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice’. 5 December 1938. 
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public of an illegal weapon – were required to appear at the lower magistracy court.22 The 
three judges of the court had the power to sentence a guilty party or acquit them of all 
charges.  A public prosecutor presented the State’s case while a representative of a civil party 
might also be present.  A lawyer for the defence spoke for the accused.  Lawyers could cross 
examine the defendant and both sides could call witnesses.  The justices could not impose the 
most serious of punishments (that power was reserved for the assizes court), but they could 
impose hefty fines and imprisonment of up to five years.23 In the cases of individuals tried for 
offences relating to political violence it was highly unusual for a person not to benefit from a 
suspended sentence (termed a penalty avec sursis), whether this related to a prison term or a 
fine.  A suspended sentence could be granted only to a first-time offender.  If political groups 
interpreted such a qualification to be evidence of judicial indulgence toward their enemy, it is 
possible that the courts looked favourably on the absence of a prior criminal record, too.24    
When the subject of a police investigation was designated a crime, the accused was 
required to appear before the assizes court.25  Cases came before this superior court only after 
a long and detailed examination of the facts by an investigating magistrate (juge 
d’instruction).  This magistrate had broad powers: he reviewed the evidence and police 
reports, questioned the accused, and spoke with witnesses.26 The investigation could last up 
                                                 
22 Martin BF. Crime and criminal justice under the Third Republic: The shame of Marianne. 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990, p. 140; Dononvan JM. Magistrates and 
juries in France, 1792-1952. French Historical Studies 1999; 22: 382. 
23 Martin, Crime and Criminal Justice, pp. 174-6. 
24 On the law of sursis see Maxwell, Manuel du juré, pp. 72-74. 
25 For an excellent explanation of the judicial procedure from arrest to trial see Garner JW. 
Criminal procedure in France.  The Yale Law Journal 1916; 25: 255-284. 
26 Dononvan, Magistrates and juries, p. 382. 
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to six months.  Having compiled a dossier on the crime, he consulted with the public 
prosecutor (procureur) before deciding upon whether to issue an indictment or to dismiss all 
charges (termed a non-lieu).  In the event of a recommendation for an indictment, the final 
decision rested with the chambre des mises en accusation (the indictment court), whose five 
judges reviewed written representation from all parties.  When the decision to indict was 
upheld, the case was transferred to the assizes court.  Lawyers in this court represented the 
defence, the state prosecution, and a civil party where applicable.27   
To some extent the defendant at the assizes court faced an uphill battle from the 
moment of indictment: with the magistrate’s pre-trial investigation intended to establish the 
likelihood of a successful prosecution, to come to trial implied that the accused was guilty, at 
least in the eyes of the investigator and a handful of judges.28 The opening of the trial could 
potentially disadvantage further the accused. The clerk of the court opened the trial with the 
reading of the accusatory indictment statement (acte d’accusation).  The presiding judge then 
delivered an often-lengthy speech that explained the crimes of which the defendant was 
accused and his or her prior criminal record.  While juries were advised not to convict a man 
for his past misdeeds, such information was intended to expose the potentially habitual nature 
of the defendant’s criminality. 29 The judge also allowed the defence to outline its argument 
in the interests of impartiality yet the opening of a trial tended to take the form of a hostile 
cross-examination of the man or woman in the dock.30 ‘[I]t is a marvel that defending counsel 
                                                 
27 Martin, Crime and Criminal Justice, pp. 150-156. 
28 Ibid., p. 142; p. 145; p. 169; p. 178. 
29 Maxwell, Manuel du juré, p. 106; Chauvaud, La chaire des prétoires, p. 104. 
30 Chauvaud, La chaire des prétoires, p. 104; Donovan, Magistrates and juries, 386; Garner, 
Criminal procedure in France, 267; Maxwell, Manuel du juré, p. 106.  
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is able to do anything for the accused at all’, remarked H. Cleveland Coxe in the 1904 Yale 
Law Journal. 31 
Nevertheless, a conviction at the assizes court was far from assured.  The decision to 
convict lay with a jury of twelve men, selected from a predetermined list of men of good 
moral standing.32 A simple majority of seven was required for a conviction.  For Republicans, 
the 1791 introduction of the right to a trial by a jury of ‘citizen-judges’ represented a 
revolutionary victory over the arbitrary justice of the monarch.33 However, it was not long 
before the rather lenient decisions of the jurors began to arouse criticism. To remedy the 
situation, the French authorities resorted to two measures.  Firstly, in 1832 legal reform 
introduced the provision of ‘mitigating circumstances’.  Jurists believed that in cases where 
the penalty seemed too severe for the relative seriousness of the crime, jurors preferred to 
acquit.  It was hoped, therefore, that a jury would be more likely to convict if the sentence 
could be reduced for acts committed in mitigating circumstances, the details of which 
remained undefined in French law.  At the same time the crime of assault without the 
intention to cause death was introduced to further ensure that the guilty were not allowed to 
walk free.34   
                                                 
31 Coxe HC. Personal liberty in France. The Yale Law Journal 1904; 13: 221. 
32 Jury selection was democratised when the workers were no longer excused from jury 
service.  See Maxwell, Manuel du juré, pp. 9-16 for a full list of the requirements of jurors 
and the reasons for exclusion from service.  
33 Donovan, Magistrates and juries, 379.  For a brief overview of the history of the jury in the 
French legal system see Pradel J. Le jury en France: Une histoire jamais terminée. Revue 
internationale de droit pénale 2001; 72: 175-179. 
34 Tanguy J-F. Tuer sans intention de tuer: quand l’intention, et non l’effet, construit le crime. 
In: Follain A, Lemesle B, Nassiet M, Pierre E and Quincy-Lefebvre P (eds) La violence et le 
14 
 
Secondly, the policy of ‘correctionalisation’ aimed to ensure a higher rate of 
conviction.  Correctionalisation entailed the trying of cases usually reserved for the assizes 
court in the lower magistrates court.  The practice originated in a circular sent to officials of 
the judiciary by the Minister of the Interior in 1842.  The Minister believed that the judges of 
these courts would be less likely to acquit a defendant than a jury at the assizes court.  While 
this illegal directive was later revoked, it remained common practice and thus created a 
discrepancy in the judicial system that could see two men tried in different courts for the 
same crime.  Correctionalisation persisted beyond 1918 and the number of cases heard at the 
assizes court steadily decreased.35 
Despite the reform of 1832 and the implementation of correctionalisation, by the end 
of the nineteenth century there was still much dissatisfaction with the outcome of trials by 
jury, especially in cases of violent crime. 36 Yvernes observed that the more serious the crime 
(and the more severe the potential punishment), the more lenient a jury still tended to be.  He 
noted further that when jurors granted mitigating circumstances to a convicted person, the 
presiding judges often compounded the leniency of the jury in reducing the penalty by two 
degrees when the law required solely a reduction of one.37 Joseph Maxwell’s 1913 handbook 
for jurors – endorsed by contemporary magistrates of renown - sought to shore up the 
‘firmness’ of the jury through a thorough explanation of the panel’s duties as well as the 
                                                                                                                                                        
judiciaire.  Discours, perceptions, pratiques. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2008, 
pp. 251-264. 
35 Donovan, Magistrates and juries, 410; Yvernes, Le crime, p. 8. 
36 Chauvaud, La chaire des prétoires, p. 126; Ferguson, Judicial authority and popular justice, 
293; Garner, Criminal procedure in France, 278, Yvernes, Le crime, p. 14. 
37 Yvernes, Le crime, pp. 15-16. 
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procedure of trials and matters of sentencing.38 For Maxwell, the leniency of jurors was a 
serious matter for it potentially explained the doubling of the murder rate between 1896 and 
1909.  A similar argument in relation to the broader crime rate had been made during the 
nineteenth century.39 Thus while the assizes court could deliver severe sentences to the guilty 
from five years’ imprisonment to forced labour and death, the jury usually ensured that 
punishment was not so severe. 
From where did the apparent leniency of the jury emanate? Juries delivered verdicts 
based on their moral understandings of a crime and its motives rather than the strictures of the 
law.  Each took an oath to listen to their conscience and ‘inner conviction’ to come to a 
verdict that would be in the interests of not only the accused but also of society.40  According 
to Eliza Earle Ferguson, the facts of the crime mattered less than the perceived legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of the act.41 Violence that was deemed socially or culturally acceptable could 
potentially be punished with mitigating circumstances - or not punished at all.42  
Furthermore, the procedure, rituals, and rules of the assizes courtroom could also 
sway a jury.  The commencement of proceedings could arouse sympathy for the accused, 
particularly if he or she appeared browbeaten under the presiding judge’s opening 
                                                 
38 Maxwell, Manuel du juré; Chauvaud, La chaire des prétoires, p. 117. 
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Institute for European Legal History 1014; 22: 251; Martin, Crime and criminal justice, p. 
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intervention.  Furthermore, there were few rules to govern the submission of evidence or the 
admission of witness testimony.  In fact, with the criminality of the act believed to be 
discoverable solely through a full appreciation of the character of the accused and the victim, 
as well as in the circumstances of the offense, witnesses could speak at length of matters with 
little regard for the direct relevance of their testimony to the crime.  At the trial of political 
activists it was not unusual for over one hundred witnesses to be called.  Many of these 
witnesses had not been present at the time or place of the alleged offence.  Instead they spoke 
fervently for the guilt or innocence of the defendant based on his or her political loyalties.43  
Lawyers could act likewise.  
The performance of witnesses and lawyers was therefore paramount.  It was believed 
that a barnstorming speech from a lawyer or a witness could intoxicate not only the jury but 
also the audience to such an extent as to influence the outcome of the trial.44   According to 
Frédéric Chauvaud, contemporaries recognised the theatricality of proceedings at the assizes 
court: reports of criminal trials were replete with theatrical vocabulary in which the ‘actors’ 
played in the ‘judiciary drama’ (drame judiciaire).45 In such a respect, trials were not unlike 
the political meetings of the period in which the performance of an orator was thought to 
                                                 
43 All manner of witnesses could be heard, not just those who had been at the scene of the 
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scandale. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2007, pp. 128-131.  
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have an impact upon the behaviour of an audience.46  The forces of order evidently feared 
that the scenes of violence witnessed at political meetings would be repeated at trials, too.  To 
avoid confrontation outside the courthouse it was not unusual for the surrounding streets to be 
cordoned off and occupied by contingents of soldiers, Mobile Guard riot officers, and police 
constables.47  
When the decision of a judge or jury went against a defendant, political groups cried 
foul, citing the partisan bias inherent to the legal system.  The extent to which groups had 
genuine grounds for this suspicion is unclear.  Often it appeared that left-wing activists were 
arrested and punished more frequently than their right-wing opponents.  While an anti-
communist bias might be perceived in the behaviour of the police, especially during the 
tenure of Paris Prefect of Police Jean Chiappe, the left’s penchant for organising massive and 
sometimes illegal street demonstrations (compared to the right’s preference for private 
political meetings) meant that socialist and communists activists were simply more likely to 
find themselves in confrontational situations with police officers.48     
In the perceived absence of justice, political factions threatened to exact their own 
retribution upon opponents.  In the aftermath of an attack on a communist party meeting in 
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March 1926, the communist daily newspaper L’Humanité warned, ‘These fascists injured our 
comrades in an inglorious ambush... it is not before justice that we shall hold them to 
account, we look after our own defence’.49 The party regularly condemned the ‘class justice’ 
of the bourgeois Republic that persecuted the working class.50 Similarly, in January 1934, 
leader of the fascist Franciste league Marcel Bucard threatened that if the Republic did not 
punish the guilty (namely Jews, communists, and Freemasons), the Francistes would, ‘put 
violence at the service of Justice.  We will raise the guillotines in the four corners of Paris 
and we will cut off heads’.51 While such rhetorical violence may have been cathartic for 
certain activists, it threw into question the perceived legitimacy of the courts and the rule of 
law.  Street violence against one’s enemy was frequently framed as a form of extra-judicial 
punishment.52   
The partiality of the courts may be perceived in cases that concerned police officers, 
rather than activists of left or right.  Low level-violence committed by police officers was 
tolerated.  In February 1929, for example, the case of Théodore Sandos and Marie Balme du 
Garay came before the eleventh correctional court in Paris.  Both men were members of the 
monarchist league, the Action Française.  They stood accused of assaulting officers of the law 
during a demonstration in Paris on 19 January 1929.  When a witness to the violence claimed 
that he had overheard a police officer say to Sandos, ‘It’s alright, I’ve got you, you’ll pay for 
[the crimes] of the other one’, before proceeding to assault him, lawyer for defence Georges 
Calzant protested to the judge: it was not fair, he argued, to tolerate such action from the 
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police which made ‘Peter pay for the crimes of Paul’.  In response, the prosecutor, asked the 
witness, ‘Wasn’t the officer’s face covered in blood?’.  When the witness replied that it was, 
the prosecutor simply concluded, ‘Well that explains it.’53 Sandos and Balme du Garay were 
subsequently jailed. The exchange here illustrates the broader toleration of the gratuitous 
‘minor’ violence regularly doled out by police officers to political activists, with the apparent 
connivance of their superiors.  Police beatings did not discriminate between left- and right-
wing activists and, it seems, nor did the decisions of the courts.    
On the other hand, violence against officers of the law was considered more serious 
than fighting amongst political activists.  Charges were dropped in such cases on a less 
frequent basis than for other offences.54 Men and women convicted of this offence could also 
receive a harsh punishment, a fact that is particularly striking given Jean-Claude Farcy’s 
observation that the judges of the lower magistrates court tended to act with clemency.55 In 
November 1935, for example, Gabriel Cavalade was arrested on his way to an Action 
Française demonstration.  He was found to be carrying, ‘two spiked corks intended, without 
doubt, to be thrown under the hooves of the gendarmes’ horses’.  Charged with the 
possession of, ‘equipment harmful to public security’, he was sentenced to three months’ 
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imprisonment and a 300 Francs fine.56 Usually, activists convicted of possessing illegal 
weapons in public received a suspended sentence of between sixteen and 50 Francs only.  
Even verbal insults to the police could carry a hefty fine: in May 1935 communist activist 
Montjauvis was fined 100 Francs for calling the police a ‘bunch of pigs’ during a political 
meeting.57 Consequently, the harsh punishment of relatively minor offences involving 
officers revealed a desire to protect the police and deter aggression against them. 
Left-wing groups often accused the magistrates of acting mercifully toward right-
wing activists while passing heavy sentences against antifascists.58 In December 1935, for 
example, the cour correctionnel in Caen sentenced ten young antifascists to a total of six 
years and eleven months in prison for violence against members of the extreme right-wing 
Croix de Feu at Mondeville.  Local left-wingers protested the sentences against these ‘honest 
workers’ with no prior criminal convictions.  The local Radical Party Federation pointed to 
the inequality of sentences handed down to these men compared with those usually passed 
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against right-wingers.59 Yet the sentences in part reflected the character of left-wing violence; 
antifascists were more likely to commit offensive acts than their right-wing enemies.  The 
incident at Mondeville was a case in point.  The charge of violence against the activists was 
aggravated by that of premeditation and ambush, which seemed to explain why the sentences 
were relatively more severe.60  
The courts came under pressure from Paris to pass down harsher sentences when 
immediate political context required a reinforcement of law and order.  In March 1934, for 
example, Minister of Justice Henri Chéron sent two confidential circulars to public 
prosecutors across France.  He stressed in the circulars that the need to maintain public order 
at a time of growing political tension was paramount; ‘a particularly firm application of the 
current legal measures’ was essential.  Chéron advised prosecutors to seek ‘severe sentences’ 
against anyone found guilty of an infraction to the law of 24 May 1834 on carrying banned 
weapons, as well as against activists arrested during illegal demonstrations.  He further asked 
that prosecutors oppose the granting of a suspended sentence in all such cases and mount an 
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appeal in the event of an unsatisfactory outcome.61 The following month, evidence from the 
Seine suggests that this crackdown was taking effect.  The public prosecutor wrote to one of 
his subordinates about the posting of a small sticker (papillon) in public in the department 
upon which was printed, ‘Watch this Fascist’ (Fasciste à surveiller’).  The prosecutor 
explained that the display of such a sticker was neither an offence nor an act of violence in 
itself, but that perhaps one could consider the deed an act of ‘moral violence’ – especially 
with regard to ‘present circumstances’ - and so subject to the definition of violence in article 
311 of the Penal Code.  While the prosecutor recognised that such a legal precedent in this 
respect did not yet exist, he ordered that anyone seen posting such stickers should be arrested 
and sentenced at the cour correctionnel.62 The political demands of a particular moment 
could thus come to bear on the relative severity of sentencing. 
However, two months after Chéron’s circular, a shooting at Montargis seemed to 
suggest a toleration of extreme right-wing violence.  On 15 May 1934, Jeunesses Patriotes 
leaguers encountered left-wing counter-demonstrators as they left a meeting.  The leaguers 
fired a volley of revolver shots into the crowd, hitting young communist Jean Lamy in the 
leg.  Lamy later died from his injuries; his killer was never caught.  Several leaguers were 
arrested, including right-wing politician Charles Trochu who was found to be carrying an 
automatic pistol.  Officers discovered a further stockpile of guns, truncheons and 
knuckledusters in the leaguers’ cars. When the case came before the cour correctionnel, 
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Trochu received a 200 Francs fine, while his comrades were fined between 25 and 50 Francs 
each for carrying banned weapons.63   
Victor Basch, president of the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, was outraged enough at 
the apparent leniency of the sentences to write personally to the Minister of Justice.  He 
condemned the penalties because, according to his letter, left-wing activists frequently faced 
prison sentences for carrying banned weapons.  The public prosecutor in Orléans agreed.  He 
noted in a communication to the Minister of Justice that the court had, ‘taken into account the 
foreboding (mauvais pressentiments) that the accused would have had in going to the meeting 
on 15 May, and that [they would have known] it would be necessary to defend themselves’.  
The prosecutor continued: ‘[t]hat demonstrates absolutely, in my opinion, that the accused 
and in particular, their leader, Trochu knew that they would provoke a reaction, amongst a 
population completely hostile to their ideas, and that was not entirely in their favour’.  He 
concluded that the sentences were too lenient but did not press the issue.64 This was not the 
only case in which the public prosecutor decided not to press charges in the name of 
‘appeasing passions’, fearing that a criminal trial could revive tensions between enemy 
factions on the left and right.65  However, such a consideration was not sufficient in itself to 
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warrant no further action.  Other factors usually came to bear on the prosecutor’s decision, 
such as conflicting witness statements, the inability to establish the facts of the case, or the 
potential for a successful prosecution.  Political groups were not a party to these 
considerations and the judges’ decision was often perceived to be politically-motivated.66 
A series of amnesties further served to excuse crimes committed in a political context.  
The election of the left-wing Popular Front government in June 1936 was followed swiftly by 
the promulgation of an amnesty law intended to clear political activists of past convictions.  
Political considerations motivated the measure: the government sought to pardon antifascists 
whom it believed had been treated tendentiously under previous administrations.  Yet the 
amnesty applied to all offences committed by left- and right-wing activists prior to 26 June 
1936 in meetings, during electoral periods, and strikes.  Significantly, convictions for the 
obstruction of, and violence toward, police officers were reviewed on a case-by-case basis.67 
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A further amnesty in July 1937 pardoned crimes and infractions committed during street 
demonstrations.68 In one case at least, the prosecution of a case was delayed in expectation 
that the offences involved would soon be amnestied: rather than bring the men to court the 
public prosecutor in Versailles preferred to await the passing of the law at which time he 
would promptly dismiss all charges.69  
 Prosecution for offences committed during confrontations was subject to an array of 
factors that could mitigate or aggravate the seriousness of the charges and the sentences 
passed down.  While the violence of police officers was tolerated, there is little evidence of a 
systematic bias against groups of one political colour or another.  Rather, immediate 
circumstance weighed on decisions whether the obscure details of an incident, the desire of a 
public prosecutor not to reopen political wounds, or the determination of a minister to restrain 
an escalating spiral of confrontation.  It was in fact the Popular Front that made the most 
politically-motivated intervention of the interwar years when it twice amnestied crimes and 
misdemeanours connected with political violence.  Nevertheless, the amnesty laws applied to 
right-wing activists, too.  
 
Violence on trial at the assizes court 
Between January 1925 and January 1938, 79 people died during or following incidents of 
violence involving political groups.  Only two women figured among the dead: Corentine 
Gourlan and Solange Demangelle, the former killed during the riot of 6 February 1934 and 
the latter killed in March 1937 at the demonstration in Clichy.  Where the political loyalty of 
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a victim could be established, most of the dead belonged to right-wing groups (30 dead 
compared with 22 victims claimed by the left).  Five of the dead were members of the forces 
of order while police were responsible for 36 deaths.  Killings during acts of political 
violence were rarely premeditated.  While the preparedness of activists to commit violence 
meant that fatalities were always a potentiality, many deaths were apparently unintended.  
Despite the number of deaths, fewer than ten alleged perpetrators stood trial at the 
assizes court.  Cases did not reach the upper levels of the justice system for several reasons.  
Firstly, charges were usually dismissed when a killing was thought to be unequivocally an act 
of self-defence.  This was the case in March 1935 following the death of Action Française 
leaguer Alfred Treille.  The public prosecutor concluded that Treille had been killed while 
leading an Action Française attack on the offices of left-wing newspaper La Flèche in Lyon.  
The raiding party had encountered two guards in the building and Treille was mortally 
wounded in an exchange of gunfire.  His killer was not charged.70  
Secondly, when an officer of the law committed a killing, charges were likewise 
dismissed on the grounds of self-defence.  Such was the outcome in the killing of communist 
activist Henri Vuillemuin by police officer Paul Maujean on 26 February 1934 during a 
communist demonstration in the twentieth arrondissement of Paris.71 Investigators 
established that the bullet that killed Vuillemuin had been fired from Maujean’s revolver.72 
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However, the case did not make it to trial.  Maujean claimed that he had fired into the air in 
self-defence (something which police officers were nevertheless ordered not to do).  The 
judges of the lower magistrates court and Vuillemuin’s mother was ordered to pay the court 
expenses.73   
Finally, a decision for a non-lieu could arise from the impossibility of finding the 
perpetrator.  The political violence that resulted in fatalities was often committed in the 
tumult of a brawl, perhaps at night, and witnessed either by activists liable to give tendentious 
accounts of the incident or bystanders afraid of reprisals and thus reluctant to admit to having 
witnessed anything at all.74 It was often difficult to establish what had led to the violence, let 
alone who had struck the lethal blow or fired the fatal shot.75  Such was the case, for example, 
in the killing of M. Ville outside a nationalist meeting in Marseille in February 1925, and the 
murder of right-winger Jean Créton at Vrignes-aux-Bois in February 1937.76 A lack of 
evidence or confusion over the facts of an incident of murder could constrain the authorities 
to charging activists with a lesser offence, leaving the police and judiciary open to 
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accusations of ineffectiveness or indulgence.  In April 1937, for example, a fight at a bar in 
Nice between members of the fascist Parti Populaire Français and left-wingers saw antifascist 
Espaltero Rossi fatally shot.  A certain right-winger named Boyer was arrested and 
investigated for Rossi’s murder.  However, investigators found that the bullet that killed the 
antifascist was fired neither from Boyer’s revolver nor from any of the guns found in the bar.  
The magistrate was therefore forced to drop the charge of murder.  Boyer subsequently 
received a fine of 50 Francs for possession of an illegal weapon.77 The practicalities of 
interwar police work could thus preclude a successful prosecution. 
Cases that advanced to trial at the assizes court received extensive press coverage.  
Political groups followed closely the process and verdict of the trials by jury, believing them 
to be revelatory of the State’s attitude to the political doctrine accused of inspiring such 
violence, whether communism or fascism.  When the authorities managed to bring a man to 
trial by jury, evidence suggests that members of left-wing parties did not receive harsher 
sentences than members of right-wing parties or leagues.  Two trials of men from opposite 
ends of the political spectrum illustrate this fact.  The circumstances of their crime and the 
defence that they offered were very similar.  Both men – communist Joseph Roelants and 
right-wing activist Alexis Valès (a member of the Parti Social Français) - admitted to fighting 
with their victim but without the intention to commit murder.  Roelants was tried in June 
1935 at the assizes court of Versailles for the murder of Action Française leaguer Marcel 
Langlois the previous February.  Langlois had died following a blow to the head during a 
street brawl between communists and Action Française street-fighters in Le Vésinet.  
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Roelants admitted to having struck Langlois without intending to kill him.78 The trial heard 
statements from fifty-nine witnesses including Langlois’s fellow leaguers, communist leader 
Marcel Cachin, and Victor Basch.  In his closing recommendations to the jury, public 
prosecutor Balmary asked for a ‘severe conviction’ but stated that he would not oppose the 
granting of mitigating circumstances.  The jury subsequently convicted Roelants of assault 
without the intention to kill and allowed for the fact that he had acted under provocation.  He 
received 6 months’ imprisonment for the crime.79 The right-wing press cried foul but we 
should not underestimate the influence of the quirks of the superior courtroom on the jury’s 
decision: Roelants may have been spared a harsher conviction by the emotive testimony of 
twelve-year-old Charles David, a boy whom Roelants had saved from drowning.  
Furthermore, if the jury was indeed influenced by such emotion, it cannot have harmed 
Roelants’s chances that his wife gave birth during the last day of the trial.80 
The trial of Parti Social Français member Alexis Valès took place at the assizes court 
of the Tarn-et-Garonne in March 1937.  Valès was charged with causing the death of local 
communist activist Elie Cayla following a quarrel outside a political meeting in Moissac.  
The incident began when at the beginning of the meeting, several men had refused to stand 
for a performance of the Marseillaise.  In the ensuing scuffle outside the venue, Valès 
punched Cayla on the right ear.  Cayla fell and struck his head on the ground.  He died two 
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weeks later leaving a widow and two children.81 At the trial, the prosecution demanded a 
‘firm conviction’ for a man who had ‘broken the laws of friendship, hospitality and 
humanity’.  The defence’s closing plea saw lawyer Albert Gautrat deliver both a violent 
attack on the communist party (during which the lawyers for the prosecution stormed out of 
the courtroom) as well as eulogising the virtues of the Parti Social Français.  Gautrat pleaded 
with the jury to deliver a verdict that would not exacerbate political tension further.  The jury 
convicted Valès of assault and battery (coups et blessures volontaires) and he received a six-
month suspended prison sentence.82 The verdicts passed in the cases of Roelants and Valès 
were largely consonant with those delivered for violent crimes more generally in the assizes 
court.  Juries tended to look favourably on crimes that appeared to be devoid of premeditation 
and criminal intent, whether politics came into play or not.83   
Aggravating factors were more likely to influence the decision of the jury than the 
political loyalties of the accused.  Such was the case at the trial of communist activist Eugène 
Thibaut who was accused in July 1937 of the ambush and murder of Parti Social Français 
member Fernand Lafrance.84 At the assizes court of the Nord, the prosecution made much of 
the political character of the crime, claiming that Thibaut had taken exception to Lafrance’s 
apparent defection from the left to the right.  Once again the moral character of each man 
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came to the fore.  According to the presiding justice, the victim had been an ‘excellent father’ 
and a ‘respectable spouse’, while the accused had experienced difficulties in his employment.  
In his recommendation to the jury, the solicitor general stressed the political character of the 
crime and asked the jury to deliver a verdict of murder with premeditation but to consider 
allowing for extenuating circumstances.85 The jury obliged and the court – with the input of 
the jurors - sentenced Thibaut to twenty years’ imprisonment with forced labour.86 The 
severity of the sentence attested more to the fact of premeditation than the jurors’ desire to 
punish a communist. 
Of course, the verdict at the assizes court was not always so easy to predict.  In this 
respect, it is worth examining the trial of communists Jean-Pierre Clerc and Marie-Joseph 
Bernardon for the killings of four Jeunesses Patriotes outside a political meeting on the rue 
Damrémont in April 1925.  The murders caused a sensation in France coming at a time of 
high political tension.  The Jeunesses Patriotes had been founded the previous November 
along with several other extreme right-wing leagues bent on protecting France from the 
perceived threat of communism.  Meanwhile the communist party had begun to form its own 
self-defence groups to protect its meetings from ‘fascist’ attack.  On the night of 23 April 
1925 a right-wing electoral meeting in the proletarian eighteenth arrondissement of Paris was 
perceived on the left as an invasion of its territory and a provocation.  The meeting itself was 
stormy yet it ended without violence and communist orators had even been allowed to speak.  
However, after the meeting communists and leaguers clashed in the streets around the venue.  
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Tensions seem to have boiled over when a Jeunesses Patriotes ‘century’, marching in a 
column, arrived in the area in the apparent belief that their leader, Pierre Taittinger, was 
under attack.  A brawl began and shortly thereafter gun fire rang out.  Three leaguers were 
killed outright while a fourth later died from his wounds.87  In parliament the following day, 
Taittinger condemned the ‘unheard of savagery’ of the communists outside the meeting who 
attacked unarmed leaguers and were ordered to ’fire into the crowd’.88 
A year later, the trial of Clerc, a thirty-seven-year-old engraver, and Bernardon, a 
twenty-seven-year-old varnisher, commenced at the assizes court of the Seine.  The two men 
were arrested on the night of the killings, Clerc at the scene of the crime and Bernardon as he 
fled into a nearby street.  Both men were found in possession of a recently-discharged 
Browning revolver.89 Forensic investigation confirmed that the bullets extracted from the 
victims – and several other cartridges found at the scene – had been fired from Clerc and 
Bernardon’s guns.90 The victims had all been shot from behind, a fact that suggested they had 
either been taken by surprise or had been in the process of fleeing when they were 
murdered.91 Clerc and Bernardon’s claim that they had fired in self-defence seemed unlikely. 
The lawyers for the defence quickly sought to turn the proceedings into a trial of 
fascism in France, much to the anger of the prosecution.92 André Berthon, left-wing deputy 
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and Clerc’s lawyer, claimed that if the defendant had indeed fired his revolver he had not 
fired at men but at fascism itself.93 Communist author Henri Barbusse, called by the defence, 
argued that, ‘Fascism alone is responsible for the bloody fights of the rue Damrémont’.94 
Such a tactic by the defence must be understood in the context of understandings of fascism 
in France at this time.  In the wake of the murders the extreme left pointed to several historic 
incidents of ‘fascist’ aggression: on 1 January 1925 a group left-wingers had been shot by 
strike-breakers at Douarnenez while on 15 April the Jeunesses Patriotes had mounted an 
alleged ‘punitive expedition’ to Sèvres.95 When asked during the trial why he had had a 
revolver in his possession, Clerc responded, ‘To defend myself’, and cited the incident at 
Douarnenez as well as another incident at a political meeting when he had been threatened 
with a revolver by a member of the Jeunesses Patriotes.96 Likewise the right claimed that 
violence at Marseille in February 1925 during which two members of the Fédération 
Nationale Catholique were killed presented merely a prelude to the communist killings rue 
Damrémont killings.97 Such references remind us that contemporaries viewed violence 
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incidents not in isolation but as episodes in an unfolding narrative of confrontation, an 
‘exchange of blows’, according to Michel Dobry.98  
The murders at the rue Damrémont were read with reference to political events 
outside France, too.  In the immediate aftermath of the violence, in the Chamber of Deputies 
communist Marcel Cachin stated that ‘[t]he workers know what fascism is in Italy, they 
foresee what it will be tomorrow in France, and they were therefore prepared to defend 
themselves [on the night]’.99 On the other hand conservative deputy Charles Reibel – a 
lawyer who would act for the civil party in the trial – argued that murders by Italian left-
wingers prompted revenge attacks from Mussolini’s fascists because the government was 
powerless to act.100 Meanwhile, Gustave Hervé, a ferocious right-wing journalist, understood 
the killings in the context of recent communist violence in Eastern Europe and in particular 
the destruction of the cathedral in Sofia.101 The Bulgarian example arose in other sections of 
the press too.102 Political violence committed abroad thus informed understandings of the 
phenomenon in France. 
Bernardon was acquitted on all counts while Clerc was convicted of one count of 
murder and three counts of attempted murder.  However, the jury found, too, evidence of 
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provocation and mitigating circumstances.103 The court therefore saw fit to sentence Clerc to 
just three years’ imprisonment.  Communist newspaper L’Humanité hailed the verdict as a 
political testament of the ‘disgust of the middle classes... for Mussolinian dictatorship’.104 
The right-wing press read the ‘shameful’ and ‘scandalous’ verdict as no less political for it 
invited communists to continue killing patriots.105 The perceived (il)legitimacy of the verdict 
served to undermine further the trust of violent political groups not only in the judicial 
process but also in the Third Republic itself.  In Jeunesses Patriotes and Action Française 
circles it was mooted that only left-wingers had been picked for the trial jury.106 Writing in 
La Liberté, Camille Aymard stated that while no one wanted to see the sort of violence 
perpetrated in Italy or Russia imported to France, if the law was afraid to judge the rue 
Damrémont killers then recourse to violence was preferable to being delivered defenceless to 
murderers.107 In the continuum of French political confrontation, the verdict passed on the 
accused represented another blow for the left against the right.  The communist party, which 
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had reason to be satisfied with the verdict, considered the trial to be merely the latest episode 
in the class struggle.108 
The most high-profile acquittal of the 1930s was that of Action Française leaguers 
Eugène Fritsch and Jean Théry.  The two men were tried at the assizes court of the Pas-de-
Calais in June 1934 for the murder of antifascist demonstrator Joseph Fontaine at Hénin-
Liétard in April 1934.  Fontaine was shot dead outside the venue of an Action Française 
meeting in Hénin-Liétard.  The meeting had been due to take place at the Palais des Fleurs 
restaurant, in a room at the rear of the establishment that could be accessed only via a 
corridor.  Communists and socialists in the town took exception to the staging of a right-wing 
meeting in an area that they considered to be solidly working class.  The rumour that Action 
Française speaker Léon Daudet was due to attend the meeting further incensed local 
antifascists.  Crowds of left-wing counter-demonstrators began to gather at the nearby Place 
Carnot in the afternoon on the day of the meeting.  At 6.30pm, the proprietor of the Palais des 
Fleurs opened the door at the end of the corridor leading to the venue, which gave out onto 
the Place Carnot.  A crowd of demonstrators rushed in and a fight ensued.  Fontaine was shot 
in the heart as a contingent of leaguers retreated toward the meeting room.  Police arrived, 
locked the right-wingers in the room for their own protection, and subsequently arrested 
Fritsch for the murder of Fontaine.109     
 The trial of the leaguers at the courthouse in Saint-Omer saw a large security force 
assembled, in anticipation of antifascist demonstrations in the vicinity.  For five days prior to 
the commencement of the trial, gatherings in the street were banned and cafes were subject to 
an enforced closing time of 10pm.  During the trial itself, Le Matin reported that 
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approximately 1000 officers of the Mobile Guard occupied the squares and cross-roads of the 
town while police cordons blocked the rue du Palais-de-Justice at both ends.  Witnesses at the 
trial included the usual mix of eye witnesses and notable figures in left and right-wing 
politics who had not witnessed the crime, such as communist Marcel Cachin and right-wing 
polemicist Philippe Henriot.  Such witnesses took the opportunity to wax lyrical about 
political doctrine and denounce the violence - past and present - of their enemies.  Cachin 
ended a thirty-minute soliloquy on socialism with, ‘[It’s] never one of our opponents!... The 
dead are all from our side’.  ‘And the four young patriots murdered on the rue Damrémont?’ 
responded Henri Roux for the defence.110 
The case against Fritsch and Théry seemed strong.  The prosecution alleged that 
Fritsch had deliberately aimed into the crowd and fired in an act of premeditated violence.  
Witnesses claimed that he had stood on the steps of the meeting room, four metres from the 
onrushing demonstrators, and coolly emptied his magazine into the crowd.  Théry’s charge 
related to the allegation that he had passed a new magazine to Fritsch who had then continued 
to fire.  The public prosecutor’s report seemed to confirm the version of events presented by 
witnesses.  He argued that given the angle at which the fatal bullet had struck Fontaine, 
Fritsch had fired horizontally and not upwards into the air as he claimed.111 The prosecutor 
continued that Fritsch admitted that he had not been involved in hand-to-hand fighting in the 
corridor and had suffered no injury, further confounding his claim to have acted in self-
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defence.112  Furthermore, Fritsch was known to local police authorities as ‘one of the most 
fanatical (exaltés) Action Française activists in the Nord region’ and the presiding judge 
stated to the court that he had prior convictions for carrying banned weapons and assault and 
battery.  Théry meanwhile had been convicted in the past for illegal arms smuggling.113  
The public prosecutor sought to seal the duo’s fate with a damning closing statement.  
While admitting that the crowd outside the venue had likely been overexcited, this was 
understandable given their belief that the leaguers were armed, a belief that was soon proved 
to be well founded.  He stressed that if some bullets had been fired into the air many were 
also fired horizontally at the height of a man.  Finally, he concluded that Fritsch had suffered 
no injury and could not therefore have acted in self-defence.  The prosecutor requested that 
the jury convict the men of murder and attempted murder, but he allowed for the provision of 
extenuating circumstances.  The jury subsequently acquitted Fritsch and Théry.  Furthermore, 
while Mme Fontaine was awarded 50,000 Francs in damages (a long way short of the 
200,000 Francs she requested), she was required to pay the cost of the criminal trial.114 The 
jury’s decision to acquit Fritsch of the killing of Fontaine stemmed from the fact that Fritsch 
found himself in a frightening situation, confronted as he was by a mob of antifascist 
demonstrators bent on breaking into the meeting venue at the Palais des Fleurs and beating 
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the leaguers they expected to find within.  To the jury, it must have therefore seemed 
reasonable of Fritsch to have fired his revolver directly at the onrushing mob, even though he 
had suffered no injury himself.   
When juries returned a displeasing verdict, political groups condemned not only the 
partiality of the legal system, but that of the Republic, too.  Despite the accusation of 
partiality levelled at the legal system when no one was brought to trial, the difficulty in 
establishing the true version of events, whether due to a lack of evidence or conflicting 
witness statements, influenced the decision to dismiss charges more than political bias.  If 
such an outcome was frustrating for the police authorities, it was considered damning of the 
judicial system by political groups.  When perpetrators faced a trial by jury, aggravating 
circumstances could lead to a harsher penalty.  However, the provision of mitigating 
circumstances and the granting of outright acquittals in cases of killings suggested that in 
making their decisions jurors drew not only on the arguments and evidence presented in the 
courtroom but also based on their understandings of the legitimacy of the act.  The assizes 
court was another arena in which left and right confronted each other in interwar France.   
   
Conclusion   
During the interwar years, the courts of the Third Republic meted out justice to political 
activists in an apparently even-handed manner.  The circumstances of a crime were more 
likely to hinder the arrest and prosecution of a perpetrator than political partiality.  
Nevertheless, political groups made sure that during trials the partiality of the Republic 
remained under the spotlight.  In this respect, the trials of French activists bear comparison   
with those of their German counterparts.  Henning Grunwald’s work has identified the 
courthouses of Weimar Germany as an important site in the ideological conflict of the era in 
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which both left and right sought to undermine further the Republic.115 French lawyers and 
witnesses likewise used the drama of a trial to extend the political conflict from the street into 
the court house.  Unsatisfactory verdicts provided further justification for political groups to 
organise their own defence, taking the law into their own hands.   
The relative leniency of verdicts at the assizes court was consonant with those of other 
violent crimes; the political circumstances of an offense did not warrant special 
consideration.  It is possible that the verdicts in jury trials hint at broader understandings of 
violence as a justifiable course of action when committed in self-defence.  However, in the 
1926 trial of Jean-Pierre Clerc and Marie-Joseph Bernardon, the defensive nature of the 
violence was not clear.  While Clerc and Bernardon claimed that they had been involved in a 
scuffle with Jeunesses Patriotes leaguers outside the meeting venue in Paris’s eighteenth 
arrondissement, one cannot escape the fact that the four men who died all suffered bullet 
wounds to the back, suggesting that they were either ambushed or running away from their 
assailants.  It is difficult to believe that the men were provoked into firing their weapons 
unless we accept that the very presence of the Jeunesses Patriotes in this proletarian district of 
Paris was considered a provocation in itself.  This was certainly the argument of the 
communist party both before and after the event.  Given the social division of urban space in 
interwar France, perhaps the jury had considered the leaguers to have been in unfamiliar and 
even hostile territory.  Yet it would be significant if the jurors believed that this ‘invasion’ of 
territory was met by a justifiably violent riposte.  Political groups claimed that to commit 
violence in self-defence was acceptable, even if this violence was disproportionate to the 
threat posed, while they likewise considered a violent response to the invasion of their 
political and social territory acceptable.  If recent research has demonstrated the acceptability 
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of political violence, committed in particular contexts, to activists, analysis of the decisions of 
jurors suggests that such attitudes to violence may have been shared by people beyond the 
immediate membership of political leagues and parties.  According to Ferguson, those people 
who were acquitted of violent crimes at the assizes court were deemed neither to represent a 
continued menace to society nor to be a deviant or criminal; they had simply, ‘acted in a way 
consistent with ordinary standards of behavior’.116 
The concern of judges was not to favour one political ideology over another but to 
protect the police officers who served to uphold Republican law.  When a civilian died at the 
hands of an officer, it was assumed – in some cases surely rightly - that officers had acted in 
self-defence at the risk of their own life.  It was necessary to preserve the right of officers to 
perpetrate violence and to kill in the name of law and order: on the day after the riot of 6 
February 1934, during which officers had killed or mortally wounded over a dozen protesters, 
the government of Edouard Daladier reaffirmed its unreserved support for the police, without 
mentioning the victims of their violence.117 If historians have suggested that right-wing 
sympathies amongst the German, Italian and Spanish police facilitated the move from 
democracy to fascism in these countries, the fact that the Third Republican court system 
seemed to protect officers and punish harshly their attackers offers a potential explanation of 
the loyalty of the French police to the regime.118 
In 1940, the reliable republicanism of the judiciary did not prevent its smooth 
transition, ‘virtually without personnel change’, to the authoritarianism of the Etat 
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français.119 Initially, the regime punished violent acts of resistance in the lower courts; as 
under the Third Republic, this violence was understood as criminal rather than political.120 As 
the war progressed, the regime resorted increasingly to exceptional measures.  The law of 5 
June 1943 introduced the crime of terrorism into French law to ensure that the courts 
hardened their judgements in matters of political violence.  The following month, Vichy 
toughened the trial and sentencing procedure for crimes committed against police officers.  
Such offences were subsequently subject to the judgment of two professional magistrates and 
three members of the police force.  This step allowed officers to exact vengeance on the men 
and women who had attacked their colleagues.121 If by 1943, the judiciary had remained 
largely loyal to Vichy for a variety of reasons, from obedience to the ‘legitimate power’ to 
anti-Semitism and xenophobia, the regime could rely less on the courts once the tide of the 
war had turned.  Responsibility for the repression of political crimes was handed over to the 
courts martial of the Milice.122  
The (para)militarisation of the courts and the police in matters of political opposition 
was further advanced during the campaign against Algerian nationalists in the 1950s and 
1960s.123 The violence of the Paris police against ethnic Algerians went largely unpunished 
thanks to the corrupt practices of Maurice Papon’s Prefecture of Police.  The government’s 
amnesty of 22 March 1962 ensured that all cases of the police killing or injuring of Algerians 
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in Paris were dismissed.  Police were further able to obstruct the investigation into the 
Charonne demonstration massacre on 8 February 1962; a further amnesty in 1966 meant that 
all investigations were closed.124 While one must give due weight to the changing contexts in 
which the police forces of the Etat français and successive Republican regimes were required 
to operate, the desire to protect police officers from prosecution, even for acts of extreme 
violence, represents a strand of continuity between the interwar regime and subsequent 
administrations.   
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